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maturing within that period, to be in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause and hence unconstitutional.2 6
It is evident from the foregoing cases that the Supreme Court
would uphold the license tax on Chain Stores only if it found that
there was a very substantial and significant difference between the
business and operation of the two kinds of stores. The Court
found 27 that the Chain differed from the individual store in many
respects. Quantity buying, buying for cash and thus obtaining the
advantages of a cash discount, distribution from a single warehouse,
a greater turnover, a different sales and pricing policy, cheaper and
better advertising, superior management, special accounting methods,
and standardization of store management and sales policies are some
of the advantages and distinguishing features between the two. In
upholding 28 the Indiana statute, the Court concluded as a fact that
the -Chain Store was a distinctly different enterprise from the in-
dividual store and hence presented a different taxable entity.
What will be the effect of this decision? Chain Store systems
are here to stay.29 What the effect of a tax upon them will be is
conjecture. It is a certainty that it will not put an end to the growth
and development of the system. Let us bear in mind that in certain
lines and in some communities the Chain Store has reached the
limit of its growth.30 A "Chain Menace" does not exist, it is merely
a fiction originated by the competing independent, so as to enlist
the aid of the public in his struggle with the more competent Chain
Store.
From the standpoint of the public, the question in this Inde-
pendent-Chain Store controversy is which system can provide the
desired goods and the proper service at the lowest price. Every-
thing else is subsidiary to this. Legislatures should be wary lest a
prohibitive tax on the Chain Store be too easily shifted to the
consumer.
31
PHILIP ADELMAN.
INCOME TAXATION-DEDuCTION FOR OBSOLESCENcE-GooD-
WILL.-Section 234 (a) (7) of the Revenue Act of 1918,1 and
Quaker City Cab Company v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, supra
note 15; Louisville Gas and Electric Company v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48
Sup. Ct. 423 (1928).
- State Board of Tax Commissioners of the State of Indiana v. Lafayette
A. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931).
= Supra note 27.
Supra note 1, p. 21.
"NysTaOm, ECONOmiCS OF RETAILING (1930) p. 213.
"Address of Robert M. Haig before the 1930 Convention of the National
Chain Stores Association on Business Taxation.
' REv. ACT OF 1918, C. 18, 40 stat. 1077, 1078.
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identical provisions of later Acts,2 permit "a reasonable allowance
for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence" in the
computation of net income.3 These sections have been generally, if
not uniformly, held to apply to obsolescence of tangible property,
whatever its cause, where the amount fairly attributable to the tax
year has been shown; 4 the rule including such intangible property 5
as patents,a leases,Ub and contracts.5c It has been held, but only in
'Sec. 214 (a) (8) 1921, 1924 and 1926 Acts, relating to individuals;
§234 (a) (7) relating to corporations.
'THE REv. AcT oF 1918, supra note 1, provides in part as follows: "Sec.
234 (a). That in computing the net income of a corporation subject to the tax
imposed by section 230 there shall be allowed as deductions:
* ** (7) A reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of
property used in the trade of business, including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence ** *"
'National Ind. Alcohol Co. v. Commissioner, 38 F. (2d) 718 (Ct. of App.
D. C. 1930), aff'd, 282 U. S. 646, 51 Sup. Ct. 265 (1931); Dean v. Hoffheimer,
29 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) ; Kansas City Title & Trust Co. v. Crooks,
35 F. (2d) 351 (W. D. Mo., 1929), aff'd, 46 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931);
Milwaukee Wausheka Brewing Co., 15 B. T. A. 579 (1929).
These cases are authority for the proposition that where the period of
economic usefulness of property is shortened, even though its physical life may
not be otherwise than normally affected, a reasonable deduction should be
granted. Illustrations are to be found in the effect of construction of more
modern hotels and of more modern office buildings; of changes in surrounding
conditions, caused by shifting of industry and commerce to new locations; of
property becoming inadequate to the growing needs of the expanding trade or
business; of decreased usefulness or total destruction of property caused by
legislation.
'See Art. 163, Regs. 45 (1919), REv. ACT OF 1918; Art. 163, Regs. 62
(1922), REv. AcT OF 1921; Art. 163. Regs. 65 (1924), REv. AcT OF 1924; Art.
203, Regs. 74 (1929), Rmv AcT OF 1928.
Art. 163, Regs. 45 (1920 ed.) provides in part:
Depreciation of intangible property-
"Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or business is definitely limited
in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are
patents and copyrights, licenses and franchises. * * * If * * * an intangible is
an asset acquired through capital outlay, * * * such intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance."
(a) As to patents, see Perfect Window Regulator Co. v. U. S., 66 Ct. CI.
147 (1928); Van Kammel Revolving Door Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A.
1209 (1928).
(b) As to leases, see Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364,
45 Sup. Ct. 274 (1925); Kaufman Strauss Co. v. Lucas, 12 F. (2d) 774
(C. C. A. 6th, 1926); Phillip Henri v. Reinecke. 3 F. (2d) 34 (N. D. 111,
1924) ; but cf. Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U. S. 333, 49 Sup. Ct. 337 (1929) ; Appeal
of Secor Hotel Co., 7 B. T. A. 158 (1927).
(c) As to contracts, see Lassen Lumber & Box Co. v. Blair, 27 F. (2d)
17 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928); International Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United
States, 63 Ct. Cl. 597 (1927); Tobacco Products Co. v. Lucas, 5 F. (2d) 723
(W. D. Ky., 1925).
Consequently, if good will is to be distinguished from other intangibles in
this respect, some reason must be found for this distinction.
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the lower courts, that because the obsolescence allowance, as speci-
fied in the statute, is limited to property subject to depreciation al-
lowance, no loss that is claimed for diminution in the value of
intangible goodwill, trade marks or trade names is deductible under
the statute.6 The question of obsolescence of goodwill per se has
not been disposed of in the Supreme Court. However, in Clarke v.
Haberle Brewing Co.,7 the Supreme Court denied a deduction for
obsolescence of the brewery's goodwill on the startling ground that
Congress did not intend through taxation to compensate partially
for the loss resulting from the destruction of a business which is
"noxious under the Constitution."
In Loewers Gambrinus Brewery Co. v. Anderson," decided Feb-
ruary 24, 1931, Butler, J., delivered an opinion of the Supreme
Court, in the light of which a comparison may be made with the
Haberle decision, and the soundness of the latter may be consid-
ered. In the Gambrinus case, plaintiff Brewing Company was
engaged from 1879 until 1919 in the business of manufacturing
and selling beers, ales and porter, and for that purpose, erected and
installed suitable buildings and equipment. The buildings were not
commercially adapted to any other use. January 31, 1918, it had
become common knowledge and was known to plaintiff that prohibi-
tion would become effective, and that as a result plaintiff would
suffer obsolescence in the value of its capital assets. The Court
found prohibition became effective on January 16, 1920, and there-
after plaintiff's buildings had no salvage value. The case came to
the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, limited to the question
whether plaintiff was entitled under Section 234 (a) (7) of the
Revenue Act of 1918 to any deduction for obsolescence of its tan-
gible property. Held, that the Brewery was entitled to a deduction
in computing 1918 and 1919 taxes on account of the depreciated
value of the tangibles due to the imminence of prohibition. A com-
parison between the Haberle case and the Gambrinus case is facili-
tated in that the former case was the chief reliance of the defendant
in the latter case. Justice Holmes in denying the claim of the
Haberle Brewing Company said:
"It seems to us plain without help from Mugler v.
Kansas,9 that when a business is extinguished as noxious
under the Constitution, the owners cannot demand compen-
sation from the government, or a partial compensation in
the form of an abatement of taxes otherwise due. It seems
to us no less plain that 'Congress cannot be taken to have
'Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts, 8 F. (2d) 180 (3rd Div. Minn.,
1925, aff'd, 15 F. (2d) 626 (C. 'C. A. 8th, 1926) certiorari denied 273 U. S. 763,
47 Sup. Ct. 476 (1926).
'280 U. S. 384, 50 Sup. Ct. 155 (1930) ; Renzienhausen v. Lucas, 280 U. S.
383, 50 Sup. Ct. 156 (1930), following the Clarke case.
:282 U. S. 638, 51 Sup. Ct. 34 (1931).
p123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887).
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intended such a partial compensation to be provided for by
the words 'exhaustion' or 'obsolescence.' Neither word is apt
to describe termination by law as an evil of a business other-
wise flourishing, and neither becomes more applicable because
the death is lingering rather than instantaneous." 10
It is significant that the Circuit Court of Appeals 1 in the Gambrinus
case in denying the deduction asked for, said:
"In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Clarke
v. Haberle Brewing Co., a deduction in the value of the build-
ings may not be made. We can see no difference between
tangible and intangible property within the principle case." 12
(Italics ours.)
The Supreme Court, however, as seen above, granted the deduction
for the buildings, and restricted the Haberle case to obsolescence
of goodwill. It is difficult to imagine why the Supreme Court
should regard the element of "noxiousness under the Constitution"
as controlling in the case of intangibles, and immaterial in the case
of tangibles. It is submitted that the two positions taken by the
Supreme Court are irreconcilable; it is clear that one or the other
must fall. This conclusion is further substantiated when it is con-
sidered that the basic logic of Justice Holmes in the Haberle case
and the fundamental reasoning of the Supreme -Court in the Gam-
brinus case are entirely contradictory. Compare the quotation above
presented from Justice Holmes' opinion in the Haberle case with
the following excerpt from the opinion in the Gambrinus case:
"None of the acts made any classification on the causes
from which obsolescence results. And as the sole purpose is
to arrive at the net income subject to taxation, it is clear that
such a discrimination could not reasonably or justly be made.
* * * There is nothing in the language of the statute or the
circumstances of its enactawnt to suggest that Congress in-
tended that the taxable income of brewers should not be.
arrived at according to the rules that govern taxable incomes
of others." 13 (Italics ours.)
If we accept this theory, then we must unalterably take the position
that the reasoning in the Haberle case is unsound.
10 Clarke v. Haberle Brewing Co., mupra note 7 at 386, 387, 50 Sup. Ct.
at 157.
'Lowers, Ganibrinus Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 42 F. (2d) 216 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930).
Supra note 11 at 217.
Supra note 8 at 644, 51 Sup. Ct. at 39.
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It is significant that the highest Court has not to date disposed
of the question of goodwill per se. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
had allowed such deductions, 14 but later, based mainly on the case
of Red Wing Malting Co. v. Willcuts,15 the Bureau reversed its
attitude and ceased allowing them.' 6 However, the Red Wing de-
cision has been severely criticized.17 Indeed, the Circuit Court
of Appeals in the Haberle case,' 8 in a decision written by Swan, J.,
was of the opinion that the Red Wing case was unsound, stating:
"* * * legislation which cuts short the use of tangibles in
the business necessarily limits also the goodwill. Every con-
sideration which justifies allowance for the obsolescence of
the tangibles because of compulsory future discontinuance of
the business, ought to create a similar allowance for the
goodwill." 19
• T. B. R. 44, 1 C. B. 133 (1919) provided that distillers and dealers in
liquor are entitled to a deduction for obsolescence of goodwill and other
intangibles, such deductions being limited to assignable assets, the value of
which has been destroyed by prohibition legislation. T. D. 2929 (1919) to the
same effect. In 0. D. 298, 1 C. B. 138 (1919) a like ruling was made applying
to brewers. A. R. M. 34, 2 C. B. 31 (1920) provides a method for computing
the March 1, 1913 value of goodwill, and makes special mention of obso-
lescence deductions due to prohibition. For a complete summary of Bureau
rulings on this subject, see Mr. Trammel's dissenting opinion in Manhattan
Brewing Co., 6 B. T. A. 696 (1926). The presumption is, of course, that the
long-continued uniform construction of the statute by the Treasury, the Board
of Tax Appeals, etc., is correct. Edwards v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206 (U. S.
1827) ; Robertson v. Doming, 127 U. S. 607, 8 Sup. Ct. 1328 (1888) ; United
States v. Healy, 160 U. S. 136, 16 Sup. Ct. 247 (1895); United States v. Falk,
204 U. S. 143, 27 Sup. Ct. 191 (1907) ; National Lead Co. v. United States,
252 U. S. 140, 40 Sup. Ct. 237 (1920).
' Supra note 6.
" Landsberger v. McLaughlin, 26 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
"See KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIOr (1929) at p. 658: "The author
feels free to assert that prior to this decision (Red Wing decision, ed. note),
there existed little doubt that * ** a deduction for the obsolescence of goodwill
would have been permitted."
HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1925) at p. 1095: "Obsolescence is not
ordinarily applicable in the case of goodwill, but should be allowed in excep-
tional cases, * * * where the cost of the goodwill, or its value as of March 1,
1913, if acquired prior to that date, or other method provided by statute, can be
definitely shown, and the period of obsolescence determined with reasonable
accuracy.
See also, MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1929) at pp. 321 et seq.;
BELL, AUDITING (1925) at pp. 244 et seq.; 2 FINNEY, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING
(1927) at pp. 1 et seq.; COLE, FUNDAMENTALS OF ACCOUNTING, at pp. 370 et seq.
Rolnick, The Probable Life of Goodwill as a Basis for Depreciation, TAX
MAGAZINE, issue of July 1931, at p. 248: "In the Red Wing Malting Decision
the Circuit Court quoted a number of accounting authorities whose writings
sustained the opinion of the court that goodwill is not subject to depreciation,
but the court did not point out that there are other accountants who believe
the contrary."
For a complete note on the subject of losses, see A. L. R. 500.
' 30 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
"Supra note 18 at 222.
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The Court in the Red Wing case, in denying an allowance for
obsolescence of goodwill, placed special emphasis on the meaning of
the word "including," basing its decision on the wording of the
statute. "Including" was interpreted as used in the sense of re-
stricting the "obsolescence" allowance to that which is capable of
"exhaustion, wear and tear." It may fairly be implied from that
opinion that had the statute read, "a reasonable allowance for the
exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence of property used in the
trade or business," the Court would have allowed the deduction.
It is important to note that the denial of a writ of certiorari by the
Supreme Court in that case constituted no expression on the merits.2 0
Indeed, it is also significant to note that Justice Holmes in the
Haberle case, which was exactly parallel with the Red Wing case,
had an opportunity to affirm or disaffirm the theory of the Red
Wing case; the facts of the two cases being similar, if the Red Wing
case were sound the Haberle case might have been disposed of on
the same theory. Instead, the issue was avoided, all discussion on
the wording of the statute or the nature of property was omitted,
and the decision founded solely on the "cause of the loss" which
was "legislation" branding as "noxious" an occupation theretofore
permitted by law. May we then imply that if the "cause" was not
of such character, but simply progress of science and of the arts,
that the deduction would have been allowed? May we also infer
that the failure of Justice Holmes to use the theory of the Red
Wing case, in disposing of a case with which it was identical, was
a rejection of that theory? If this is so, then we may conclude,
in the light of the Gambrinus case, that we have been furnished by
the Court with no plausible grounds to deny obsolescence ofl good-
will.
It is submitted that the inclusion in the statute of "obsolescence,"
"exhaustion, wear and tear" has no tendency to show that the al-
lowance is restricted to the obsolescence of tangible property. 21 To
exclude goodwill from the statute is to incorporate into the statute
a distinction and limitation which is not in accord with the intent
of the unrestricted language thereof. Such restrictive interpreta-
tion represents an endeavor to read into the statute limitations
which it does not contain or provide for. It has been recog-
nized that "the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is
' United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 43 Sup. Ct. 181 (1923). Holmes,
J., at 490: "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion
on the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times."
' (a) The history of the statute indicates that "there is obviously no
limitation on the kind of property to which the allowance attaches-personal,
real and mixed; tangible and intangible."-KI=iN, op. cit. supra note 17
at p. 652.
(b) The term "exhaustion" is not confined to physical consumption,
lessening or diminution of tangible property, but includes the exhaustion of
value or usefulness of intangible property having a limited useful life (supra
note 4).
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always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense." 22
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established
rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear
import of the language used.2 3  In case of doubt, they are construed
most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.2 4
It is further submitted that the allowance for obsolescence is
as necessary for the computation of net income in the case of good-
will property as in the case of tangible property,25 and therefore the
former should merge equally with the latter within the comprehen-
sion of the unrestricted language of the statute. The term "prop-
erty" in the act under consideration is not used in a restricted sense.2 6
Goodwill is property of an intangible nature, and the term "prop-
erty" includes goodwill, the importance of goodwill property having
been universally recognized in recent years.27 Goodwill property
is clearly used in the business just as other intangibles are.28  It
may be bought and sold therewith and as an incident thereof.29
There is no doubt that the goodwill property of the brewing com-
panies was rendered obsolete by the adoption of prohibition. Where
the goodwill represents money, labor, and time invested in building
up the business, it should be considered a capital asset, indistin-
guishable from other property for which the deduction is allowed.
That there is much confusion in the courts dealing with this
subject has been shown. Further clarification by the Supreme Court
is of the utmost importance. If the deduction allowance for good-
will is economically justified, the Supreme Court should make it
legally so.
THEODORE S. WECKER.
=Lynch v. Alworth Stevens, 267 U. S. 364, 45 Sup. Ct. 274 (1925).
'Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917) ; United States v.
Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 256 (1920) ; Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529,
42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1922) ; United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 44 Sup. Ct.
69 (1923).
' Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct. 270 (1918) ; Smietanka v.
First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S. 602, 42 Sup. Ct. 223 (1922) ; Hecht v.
Malley, 265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462 (1923); Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1928).
Doyle v. Mitchel Bros., 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467 (1918); United
States v. Ludley, 274 U. S. 295, 47 Sup. Ct. 608 (1927).
Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436, 13 Sup. Ct.
944 (1893); Washburn v. National Wall Paper Co., et al., 81 Fed. 17 (C. C. A.
2d, 1897); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. C.
Del., 1920).
-Kaufman Straus Co. v. Lucas, 12, F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926);
Phillip Henrici Co. v. Reinecke, 3 F. (2d) 34 (D. C. N. D. 111, 1924).
Camden v. Hunt, 144 U. S. 104, 12 Sup. Ct. 586 (1892) ; Sawilowsky v.
Sawilowsky, 288 Fed. 533 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Coca Cola Co., supra note 26 at p. 805.
' Supra note 26.
